Abstract
Introduction
In this paper, I will address a rather specific question that is seldom asked: "How are fundamental laws involved in the practice of scale modeling?" The reason this specific question deserves our interest, however, arises from what it has to do with the more general question of how laws and models can be related to each other: The answer to the specific question of how fundamental laws are involved in the practice of scale modeling is very different from answers usually given to the more general question.
The point of difference, we shall see, is this: the answer to the general question "How are fundamental laws involved in reasoning that uses models?" is often something to the effect that the only way for fundamental laws to apply to the real world in model-based reasoning is for them to be applied to -or, sometimes, to be identi- Mind & Society, 5, 2002, Vol. 3 fied with features of -abstract or idealized models. In contrast, this view does not cover scale models, which are concrete. Although the answer to the more general question is often regarded as comprehensive, i.e., meant to cover all model-based approaches, some of the authors who have provided proper foundations for these claims have realized that they must explicitly exclude scale models from their accounts of how models and laws are related (e.g., Hesse 1967 , Boltzmann 1904 .
Many different varieties of models are recognized in philosophy of science, but there is something they tend to have in common: on most views of scientific inference that involves models, the model is thought to act as some sort of intermediary between the actual world and something abstract, such as a principle, theory, or law. Sometimes the model itself is taken to be abstract. Here's an example of the sort typically given to illustrate the function of a model: suppose one has a theory or set of equations describing how electricity flows in a network. The theory may be a set of statements or it may be something even more abstract (e.g., on the semantic view, set-theoretic objects and relations between them). To apply a theory or a set of equations to an actual network, one might proceed by making an idealized model of a particular network. On the common view, after the idealized model of the network has been formulated, one then uses formal rules about how to draw inferences from the theory, equations, or statements describing the laws governing the behavior of electricity in networks to infer the behavior of the model network.
It is not going to be important to making my point whether the formal methods one uses in describing or making predictions about the model are geometrical, graphical, statistical, set theoretic, or logical. What is important to my point is that, on the common view, (i) the involvement of the formal methods is that they are used to infer features of, or the behavior of, the model network; and (ii) there is one further step: mapping the results drawn for the model onto some piece of the world: e.g., an expected observation, an action to be taken, and so on. The reason that I have not here made anything important depend upon whether one tends to use a "syntactic" or "semantic" view of theories is that, for the point I will be making in this paper regarding models, the difference does not matter: on either view, when it comes down to using the theory in explaining or predicting phenomena in our experience, the notion of model in play is that the model is abstract and needs to be mapped onto "the world" in some way.
That these features of models are common to so many different accounts of what a theory is reflects, I think, that these features of models are somewhat ingrained in pure science, philosophy of science, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence: so much so, that it doesn't seem as though this general notion of model could be excluding anything -it seems to be comprehensive. However, it is not comprehensive. The alternative to it I discuss here is valuable in that it illustrates something that may not occur using the ingrained notion of model I've alluded to above. It illustrates how laws can be involved in model-based reasoning which does not treat models as mediators between the real world and our formal methods -in which the models are in the world.
That such an alternative exists is significant to many views in philosophy of science. One example is the topic of scientific realism. For if it were true that laws can
